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Fire-Setting: Age Trends and Psychometrical Diagnosis 
of Competency Criteria for Liabilityl 
Wilfried Bommers 
The following studies are related to the competencies of minors relevant in German civil 
law. However, they are specialized in several other respects. First, as a specialized field 
of competencies, tort law competencies of minors have been chosen, which are only part 
of the larger field of developmental assumptions related to the age limit of seven years 
in German civillaw. These are regulated by § 828 BGB (German civil code of 1900) 
and its legal implications. Undeutsch (1967) has summarized the Supreme Court rulings 
on the competency criteria for liability of minors since the beginning of this century. 
The two principle interfaces between psychology and law in this field are de lege lata 
and de lege ferenda (Wegener, 1981). The former looks at cognitive development related 
to issues of forensic competency evaluations of minors in tort (delictual) law suits (§ 
828 TI BGB), whereas the latter looks at the delictual (§ 828 I BGB) and contractual (§ 
104 I BGB) law assumptions of the seven-year age limit in German civillaw. Hommers 
(1983, 1989) has reviewed the available empirical evidence, which was only indirectly 
concemed with this problem, and has discussed methods for further examinations. Relevant 
empirical aspects of both interfaces are consequently pursued in the present approach 
directly, but still restricted to tort law competencies. 
The Supreme Court criteria for tort law (delictual) capability of minors in German 
civillaw rest on the preassumption that the individual child has one or both of two com-
petencies when having reached the age of seven years: knowledge of right and wrong 
when doing harm and some understanding of the duty to make recompense for harm. 
As a consequence, an individual minor may be exempted from damages only if an expertise 
proves that he or she did not have the necessary capabilites at the time of the tort. On 
the other hand, if the expertise found that the individual child had the capability to know 
right and wrong, the second preassumption, understanding the duty to make recompense, 
will not be questionable. Instead, it is assumed that the capability to know right and wrong 
proves the understanding of the duty to make recompense. Thus, jurisprudence implicitly 
assumes that the duty to make recompense is understood earlier in cognitive development 
than the knowledge of right and wrong in a specific case. Aside from the developmental 
sequence, it is also possible to test the diagnosticity assumption of whenever knowledge 
of right and wrong is present, understanding the duty to make recompense is also present. 
However, the use of the specification "some understanding " in the Supreme Court rulings 
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on the recompense competency shows that no high standard is held that has 10 be proven 
for attributing the necessary cognitive ability 10 a child. 
Both competencies have intellectua1 and emotional~uative components as the Supreme 
Court ruled. The former may be operationalized with respect 10 the appreciation of the 
wrong against the harmed person. Thus, scores on certain IQ sub tests may be used as 
substitutes ü more direct assessment of appreciation is not feasible. For the latter, the 
classical notion of discemment may be the basis for its operationalization. Since no specific 
assessment approaches were used for the latter, the present contribution is concemed 
with testing the developmental assumptions for discemment in cases of purposeful and 
negligent tom. According to the classical discemment concept (Waibel, 1970), the right-
wrong capacity may be assessed by judgment differences between negligent and inadvertent 
fire-setting or by judgment differences of purposeful versus inadvertent fire-setting, other 
variables kept constant. These differences can be measured with ratings of single stimuli 
presented successively or with choices between two stimuli presented simultaneously. 
Moreover, the low standard of the Supreme Court on the understanding of the recompense 
duty allowed the extension of the classical discemment notion. Therefore, the recompense 
capacity may also be assessed by judgment differences and in particular with judgment 
differences between apology conditions and no apology conditions, other conditions kept 
constant. 
In cases of negligent torts, two capacities of the average child of the same age as the 
harmdoer are relevant in addition 10 those two discussed above. Following from § 276 
BGB (culpa of the harmdoer) and § 254 BGB (contributory negligence), knowing the 
dangerousness of the harmful act and performing up 10 these cognitive capabilites is 
necessary for attributing liability to a minor as well as to every person. However, here 
an average standard is used in which an individual child's competencies are irrelevant. 
Thus, psychological research on average age trends of relevant cognitive and volitive 
competencies are of interest. However, the Supreme Court used two concepts (Waibel, 
1970) for the risk -oriented cognitions involved, one being the general duty to avoid negligent 
acts (relevant for § 828 BGB), the other being the concrete part related 10 the actually 
existing danger (relevant for § 276 BGB). Thus, individual competency criteria, in particular 
of the knowledge of right and wrong, apply also to cases of minors' negligent tom. 
Finally, the special tort of arson is chosen (Canter, 1980; Prins, 1986). Children's 
fire-setting may be of interest for practical reasons, either because it is a behavioral problem 
of children andjuveniles (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1981) requiring prevention and modifi-
cation (Ell, 1983; Holland, 1969), or because the sire of the losses involved frequently 
results in civillaw suits against minors, in which the capacity of the minor might be tested 
(Dauner, 1980; Ell, 1983). Also, there are empirical results from such expertise cases 
(Dauner, 1980) that indicate that the relevant cognitive abilities of the minors may develop 
differently across different tom. Thus, arson appeared as an ecologically valid choice. 
For forensic expertise judgments, procedures for the assessment of individual differences 
in judgments of children are apparently of interest. But, the main problem for making 
forensic diagnoses is methodological: to obtain estimates of reliability and to show that 
the assessment of deliclual capacities cannot be replaced by other measures like general 
intelligence. Therefore, two original empirical studies employed culpa and post-act informa-
tion suitable for testing the preassumption of some understanding of the recompense duty 
and for individual diagnoses of the discemment of negligent and purposeful frre-setting 
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in comparison with inadvertent fire-setting. In these studies, choice responses and rating 
responses were used for data collection, and direct and indirect psychometric assessment 
of the measurement errors (Huber, 1973) were employed for competency diagnoses. 
Moreover, scores on some subtests of intelligence were determined for testing their 
independence from the results on discemment diagnoses. 
Experiment 1 
The main points of the first study were to compare the mean age trends of the culpa effect 
and of the post-act-behavior effect, to provide results on the reliabilities of these effects 
in individual assessments, to test the two implicit hypotheses about the relation between 
knowledge of right and wrong and understanding the duty to repair, and to examine the 
correlations between these individual effects and intelligence measures. 
Melhod 
Twelve illustrated stories on incidents of fire-setting by a child were used as stimuli. 
They were presented to four groups of male and female preschool students (N=33, 5-
to 6-year-olds), elementary school students (N=38, 7- to 100year-olds), secondary school 
students (N=37, 11- to 15-year-olds) and adults (N=40). The stories factorially combined 
two damage levels (totally burnt doghouse, partly burnt bam), two culpa levels 
(inadvertently, when helping to search for a wallet lost by a farmer and striking a match 
to cast light in a dark corner; purposefully, becoming angry with the farmer who told 
the child to tidy up the bam as a punishment for stealing cherries), and three levels of 
post-act behavior (no apology by tuming one's back on the farmer, apology by shaking 
hands with the farmer, helping to repair the burnt building). The two culpa levels were 
illustrated by two pictures each, the levels of the other factors by one picture each. Each 
picture was accompanied by a short text that was verbalized during the instruction by 
the examiner and later on by the subject. During the training phase of the rating task, 
subjects were presented all stimuli levels of each one of the stimuli factors simultaneously 
(damage first, followed by post-act behavior, and then culpa), and they rated them on 
a good-bad rating scale consisting of 13 black (right side of the scale) and 13 white bars. 
These bars were 0.5 cm thick and increased in size up to 6.0 cm from the middle to the 
ends. Afterwards, four complete story stimuli were arranged in correct order and were 
rated by the subjects. 
The session started with the subtest MT (Block Design) of the HA WIK-R (Tewes, 
1983). Afterwards, subjects entered the training phase. After two additional complete 
trial stimuli, which were used for retest reliability measures of the ratings, the subtest 
WT (Vocabulary) of the HA WIK-R followed. Then the twelve stimuli were presented. 
These were given in two sequences, each to half of the subjects. Finally, the subtest A V 
(Comprehension) of the HA WIK-R was administered. 
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Resu/ts 
There were three main results: the age trends of the means, the assessments of individual 
effect differences, and correlations between individual effect differences and IQ subtest 
scores. Figure 1 presents the comparison of means for preschool and elementary school 
children as a function of three stimulus informations: Damage with levels "bumt dog-house" 
or "partly burnt coach-house" (horizontal axis), post-act behavior of the minor with the 
levels "no apology", "apology", and "helping with the repair" (curve parameters), and 
the culpa of the minor with the levels "inadvertend when helping with aburse search" 
and "purposeful as a revenge" (left and right part of each graph). Mainly, a strong effect 
of apology, a small effect of culpa, and a twofold disordinal age trend of apology and 
help with damage in the purposeful-Ievel are visible. The means of the two oider age 
groups resembled the 7- to 10-year-oids fairly wen. 
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The clearly visible main effect of culpa and of the difference between no apology and 
apology will be discussed with other results later (fable 1). Primarily, Figure 1 shows 
the results of the group means related to the 7-year age 1imit. As one can see, there are 
two "disordinal" effects in the preschoolers' means. To apologize for a purposeful fire-setting 
appeared better to the preschoolers than to help repair the damage. Similarly, to apologize 
for the larger damage appeared in their judgment better than to apologize for the smaller 
damage. This latter result was supported statistically by a significant tripie age x damage 
x culpa interaction, F(1, 144) =4. 178,p=.007, and in part by a significant age x damage 
interaction, F(3,144)=6.021, p< .001. These two disordinal age trends around the age 
of seven years may indicate that preschoolers judge from a different recompense morality 
than elementary schoolers. The former may take into consideration the subjective efforts 
that the recompense implicates for the harmdoer, whereas the latter may center on the 
effect to the victim of the harm. Since similar disordinal age trends were found with various 
forms of another scenario (Hommers, 1986a, 1986b) and when comparing homogeneous 
age groups of 6- and 8-year-olds, this reliable result on the development of the understanding 
of the duty to make recompense seems to support the seven-year civi1law age limit. 
HoweveT, this support exists aside from the presence of undeTstanding the duty to make 
recompense up to the standard of "some understanding" , as shown by results discussed 
below. 
The mean data structure of secondary school children and adults was very similar to 
the elementary school children in Figure 1, except that the difference between repair 
help and apology was largeT (see also the third column of Table 1) and their damage 
effects (which took the expected direction) were significant (p< .05 or < .001) in both 
older groups. Also, there was no main effect of age in contrast to Irving and Siegal (1983) 
who found a decrease of punishment as a function of age (4 groups from 7 to 17) with 
an arson scenario. Thus, no moral evaluation, but only punishment differences may exist 
in arson cases across age groups. However, age did influence the effect sires of the stimulus 
components, as shown in Table I on the basis of individual effect sizes. 
Table 1: Rctcst-Reliabilitics (r • .>, Cronbach '. er, Group MCIUII (M) and their Standard Deviation (SD) ofthe Averagcd 
LocaJ Effcct Sizcs of the Individual Subjocll for Four Groups. 
Culpa Apology Repair-belp 
(6 "Items") (4 "Items") (4 "Items") 
N r .. er M SO er M SO er M SO 
Prcschool 33 .64 .50 -2.5 4.3 .78 12.6 7.65 -.35 -Ll 3.44 
Elcmentary 38 .95 .78 -3 .4 4.03 .94 12.4 7.67 -.01 0.7 2.39 
Socondary 37 .95 .88 -6.3 4.71 .88 9.4 5.26 .27 1.9 2.19 
Adults 40 .92 .81 -5.4 3.28 .91 8.2 5.81 .40 1.6 1.99 
Total 148 .89 .77 .88 .11 
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Because there were no further disordinal interactions, rating differences for apology and 
no apology or for helping with the repair and apology as well as the differences for 
inadvertent and purposeful fire-setting were determined for the assessment of the delictual 
capacities which was eventually based on the reliability of the differences estimated with 
Cronbach's a. As the comparison of the a-coeffieients for individual effect sizes and 
the retest-reliabilities for judgments (first column of Table 1) show, ratings and effect 
sizes bad reliabilities comparable to psychometrie personality tests. Table 1 also presents 
the mean age trends in the three individual effect sizes and the relevant data for the standard 
error of measurement derived from the reliability as estimated from the a-coeffieient 
and the standard deviations for the averaged individual differences of eaeh group. 
Theeulpaeffectincreased withage, F(3, 144)=6.452,p< .001, althoughitwasalready 
significant in preschool students (p < .01), as seen in the lefthand side of Table 1, where 
standard deviations of the four age groups and a-coefficients for individual culpa effects 
are given. Whereas the former decreased, the latter inereased with age, roughly speaking. 
There was already a large effect of apology in preschool students, as expected from 
previous results with other scenarios of property damage (Leon, 1982), theft, personal 
injuries, and smearing stamps of a peer's collection (Hommers, 1988a, 1988b). 
However, the stability of the effect of apology across age reported for other scenarios 
was not found in the arson scenario. Instead, the effect of apology on judgments decreased 
from preschool students to adults, F(3,144)=3.965,p=.009, as can be seen in thecenter 
of Table 1. This result was replicated in several independent studies not reported here, 
which varied some of the methodological features of this study by employing the arson 
scenario. In part, this scenario specificity in the mean age trend of the apology effect 
may be interpretable from the relations between victim and harmdoer or from the severity 
of the harm. In the arson scenario, the victim was an adult, whereas in the previously 
used scenarios, the victim was a peer of the harmdoer. Thus, adult subjects may identify 
with the victim and regard apology to be insufficient for arson. 
There was also clear evidence that there is a development of the capability to understand 
the duty of recompense. On the one hand, there were the disordinal effects discussed 
above. On the other hand, there was an age-correlated increase in the distinctions made 
between helping to repair the damage on the one side and apology on the other, 
F(3,144)=9.854, p< .001, as seen in the righthand side of Table 1. According to the 
Supreme Court standard, this development is irrelevant for both purposes (de lege lata 
and de lege ferenda) of the civillaw competeney of understanding the duty to repair harm. 
But, it is in line with the low standard for understanding the duty to make recompense. 
Interestingly, the reliability data for these individual effects showed that there is no psych0-
metrical basis for interpreting individual effect sires of the difference between helping 
with repair and apology, although the reliability and standard deviations of individual 
effect sires show the same age trend as in the two other ones. 
Despite the arson-scenario-specific decreasing age trend of apology, the results clearly 
support the prior finding that preschool children already have some understanding of 
the duty of recompense, since they showed such a strong consideration of apology in-
formation (Hommers, 1988a, 1988b) or ofharmdoer-compensation information (Hommers, 
1986a, 1986b). As the reliability estimates and standard deviations for individual apology 
effects showed, however, this conclusion can be drawn individually on a psychometrie 
basis. Thus, the results did speak directly and positively to the legal assumptions of cognitive 
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development. In contrast, individual culpa effects were frequently nonsignificant in preschool 
students, as indicated by the mean, standard deviation, and reliability in the lefthand side 
of Table 1. Thus, the Supreme Court's developmental hypothesis concerning the 
developmental relation of the two cognitions appears valid. 
Individual diagnoses of the two competencies require the determination of the error 
level of a wrong diagnosis. The following argument leads to the choice of a high error 
probability: First, the burden of proof is on the harmdoing minor. Thus, already weak 
signs of the presence of competency should speak against him or her. Second, one can 
use the probability of the adults for the randomly produced individual effect size of one, 
that is, literally speaking, "making an average distinction", as index for tbe error probability. 
Since the adult probabilities were p= .24 for culpa effects and p= .28 for apology effects 
(the error values for this cut-off score in the other groups were, in order of age,p=.37, 
p=.30, p=.27 for culpa and p=.39, p=.30, p=.29 for apology), it tumed out that 
application of the adult error level of p= .24 would set the cut-off score for the diagnosis 
of knowledge of right and wrong to 2.14, 1.32, or 1.14; and for the duty to make 
recompense to 2.51, 1.32, or 1.28, in terms of averaged individualjudgment differences 
of scale points for the three age groups respectively. 
Another advantage of the reliability estimates for individual effect sires is that they 
may be applicable to the ratings of the instruction phase. Those may present the original 
state of the iOdividual better, whereas the ratings of the three- factorial stimuli may be 
overtrained. However, in the instruction, the method of contrasting the levels in the 
presentation was used, which may not be ecologically valid for the one-act-related com-
petency diagnosis in a law suit. Applying the above cut-off score criteria showed tbat 
11 preschool and 3 elementary school students were not showing knowledge of right and 
wrong in the instruction phase (3 preschool and 1 elementary school student for duty 
to make recompense). In the main phase of the investigation, there were 17 out of 33, 
15 out of38, 4 out of37, and 4 outof 40 subjects (in order of age) below those age-specific 
cut-off scores for individual culpa effects; and only 4, 0, 1, and 3 for individual apology 
effects. Thus, the contrasting procedure used in the instruction phase may have made 
just the diagnoses of knowledge of right and wrong more likely, thereby supporting the 
implicit theory of the Supreme Court that at least one capacity is developed well enough 
at the age of seven. 
The psychometrically based diagnoses of knowledge of right and wrong and of understand-
ing the duty to make recompense were cross-classified to test the legal assumption that 
existing knowledge of right and wrong proves the understanding of the duty to make 
recompense. For comparison, this was done with two one-sided error levels (p< .05 and 
p< .20) for the wrong diagnoses. As the frequencies in Table 2 show, there were very 
few cases, five (with p< .05) or two (with p < .20) in total (all except one ofthem were 
in the adult group), in which understanding the duty to make recompense was present 
as a diagnosis and the knowledge of right and wrong diagnosis was not present. In contrast, 
41 (P< .05) or 58 of the children and 30 (P< .05) or 33 of the adults had both diagnoses. 
Statistically the comparison of these frequencies (test of the hypothesis) with the two 
remaining cross-tabulations of the three minor groups witb an absence of knowledge of 
right and wrong (conditional base rates) was significant ~=7.96 for the 5%-level and 
5.04 for the 20%-level, df=l, p< .05). Thus, the validity ofthe implicit developmental 
theory that understanding of the duty to make recompense is developed ahead of the 
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knowledge of right and wrong is supplemented by the validity of the hypothesis on the 
strong conditional association of the individual diagnoses. 
Table 2: Cross Tabulatcd Plychomdrical fJ< .05 and p < .20 for the Numben in ParanthcIca) Diagnotea of Right-Wrong-
Knowlcdgeand ofUndentandingthe Repair-Duty on the Basis of Quantitative Judgmenta ofThree-Pactorial 
Deacriptionl of a Minor'. Pire-SeUing for Children and Adulta. 
CbiIdrea Adults 
Ri&bt-wroq-kaow!edge preseut 
Yes No Yes No 
Undentanding the Yes 41 (58) 53 (46) 30 (33) 5 (4) 
rccompen.sc>duty 
present No 1 (0) 13 (4) 4 (0) 1 (1) 
Finally, there were only two (out of 27) significant (P< .05) correlations between the 
three HA WIK-R scores and the three individual effect measures in the three groups. Only 
one of them was in the preschool student group and might have indicated that, at this 
age, some association between vocabulary and the knowledge of right and wrong as 
measured by the individual culpa effect may exist (r= .45). The other significant correlation 
was in the secondary school student group between block design and the culpa effects, 
and had no relevance for the legal questions since it was negative (r=-.37). The results 
on the multiple regression analyses involving sex and age additionally showed that the 
individual effect assessments could not be replaced by the intelligence measures, although 
there were statistically significant overall associations as indicated by the multiple regression 
coefficients for the three criteria variables (p< .001, p< .05, andp< .001). Thus, applying 
confirmative statistical standards, the correlations of judgments and intelligence showed 
that intelligence does not allow a prediction of reliable and valid individual differences 
in the moral rating task. Thus, the evaluative capacities of liability competency may not 
be replaced with intelligence testing. 
Experiment 2 
The main point of the second study was to involve the diagnosis of understanding the 
duty to avoid negligent acts as a topic of the procedure. This means that an interpretation 
of this moral knowledge is made that generalizes the discemment approach of Experiment 
1 to the assessment of the evaluative component of knowledge of right and wrong of 
negligence. Thus, ratings on a negligent fire-setting were added. 
Method 
The picture for the negligent fire-setting showed a child making a fire near the bam, 
when the accompanying text added the information that the child had recently been told 
not to do this. This stimulus was presented as a third level of the culpa stimuli factor 
in addition to the levels of inadvertent and purposeful fire-setting. However, instead of 
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the apology effect, two new aspects were inc1uded: Another kind of stimulus information 
was combined with the culpa levels, and the influence of methodologica1 variations of 
the individual assessment per contrasting procedure was investigated. First, the stimuli 
were factorial combinations of the three culpa levels mentioned before with the two levels 
of the post-act event factor, which bad a third-party compensation level (the picture showed 
a farmer in an insurance office receiving money) and the apology level of Experiment 
1. Second, two judgment procedures were used instead of the single rating procedure 
in Experiment 1. 
On the one side, subjects bad to give two ratings during the assessment task. Thus, 
a direct assessment of the standard error of measurement could be used by a repeated 
measurement approach aside from the indirect consistency approach to reliability estimates 
of Cronbach's a (indirect assessment of the standard errar of measurement) used in Experi-
ment 1. On the other side, subjects gave their ratings after six paired comparisons of 
culpa levels with constant post-act event conditions. All three paired comparisons with 
the three apology stimulus combinations and all three paired comparisons with the three 
third-party-rompensation stimulus combinations were given. Thus, two ratings were available 
for each of the six stimulus combinations and each pair of culpa levels was used twice. 
During the training phase, subjects were presented all of the stimuli levels of each one 
of the stimuli factors simultaneously (the two damage levels of Experiment 1 first. followed 
by the two post-act events, and then the three culpa levels) and rated them on the good-bad 
rating scale as in Experiment 1. Additionally, there were three pretrials of paired 
comparison, in which subjects first arranged the two correct story sequences and then 
indicated which of the two story events was better. Half of the subjects proceeded with 
the high damage level, the other half with the low damage level. This produced no effects 
on the results. After the main phase, a simplified procedure was ron in a third phase 
to check its effect on the results. Adamage level was shown and afterwards the three 
culpa levels were added verbally and subjects had to rate the combination of visible and 
auditory stimuli each. Subjects were twenty-five 5- to 6-year-olds, twenty-three 7-year-olds, 
and thirty-nine 8- to 9-year-olds, as well as 49 parents of the children. For adults, the 
procedure was shortened to a questionnaire format in which only ratings had to be made. 
Three IQ subtests of the AID (Kubinger & Wurst, 1985) were given to each child similar 
to Experiment 1. Two of them were analog to the A V - and MT -subtests of the HA WIK-R 
used in Experiment 1, the third was the BO equivalent (Picture Arrangement). Since 
correlations and multiple regression analyses yielded no contradictory results to those 
of Experiment 1 (mstead even nonsignificant multiple regression coefficients), these results 
are not discussed further in the result section of Experiment 2. However, the replicated 
absence of the correlations supported the conclusion that intellectual and emotional-evaluative 
components of the delictua1 capacity criteria have to be assessed with different methods. 
Resulls 
Tbe mean age trends showed no main effect of age for the doghouse condition, but adults 
rated more harshly in the coachhouse condition, F(1 ,70) =7.90, p=.OO6. Both results 
once more contradicted Irving and Siegal (1983), who found a decrease in punishment 
with age. Also, the culpa effect was stronger in adults with the damage condition 
coachhouse, F(2,140)=3.37,p=.037. Within the groups of children, age had no effect 
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on mean judgments of culpa levels. Furthermore, there was an age-correlated increase 
of the difference between ratings on the apology combinations and the third-party-
compensation combinations. The conditions with third-party compensation by an insurance 
company were rated significantly worse than the conditions with apology only by the 
adults, andindependentlyofthedamagecondition, F(1,102)=21.86,p< .001. Thiseffect 
para1leled the increase in the distinction between apology and helping with repair found 
in the prior study. The means (standard deviations) ofthe children were -8.8 (2.9), -5.8 
(4.4), and 1.2 (5.2) for purposeful, negligent, and inadvertent conditions (negative signs 
for the bad side of the scale), data for adults were -9.5 (2.4), -7.8 (2.9), and 1.4 (4.7). 
Thus, the negligent stimulus generally seemed to be definitely bad to all groups. There 
were clear, reliable individual differences in the evaluations when both types of measurement 
error were employed (see below). Also, clear age trends in the measurement error indicated 
that preschoolers' data were not reliable enough to malre individual assessments of capacities. 
Thus, after taking into consideration the psychometric information, an age trend associated 
with the ratings of the culpa levels tumed out to exist. 
The analyses on the methodological aspects showed that the examined methodological 
aspects were irrelevant for the results. Group reliability estimates of the ratings and of 
the three rating differences among the culpa levels showed that children' s ratings (0.76, 
0.79, and 0.80 for decreasing culpa) and their rating differences (0.42, 0.76, and 0.72 
for purpose-negligence, purpose-inadvertence, and negligence-inadvertence) were somewhat 
less reliable than adults' (0.86,0.88, and 0.89 as weil as 0.81,0.85, and 0.88 for ratings 
and rating differences respectively), but high enough for the purpose-inadvertent and 
negligent-inadvertent differences (0.76 and 0.72) to have diagnostic impact. The standard 
deviations of the differences were 2.7,5.8, and 5.5 for children and 2.2,4.5, and 4.9 
for adults. Among children, er estimates of reliability increased with age, but considerably 
more in the purpose-negligent differences (about 0.4) than in the two other differences 
(about 0.1). Similarly, across all age groups, direct assessments of the standard error 
of measurement decreased with age (6.9, 4.6,2.9, and 2.3 in average, and 13.4, 10.6, 
9.3, and 4.6 in the maximum individual standard error in the sequence of age). Finally, 
paired comparisons of children became more consistent in the choice tripels and in retests 
within their age range. Thus, the applicability of the procedure for the assessment of 
delictual competencies of minors of at least 7 years of age appeared to be psychometricall y 
sound. In particular, the psychometrically based diagnoses of the direct and indirect as-
sessment methods for the standard error of measurement produced less than 18 % of 
discrepancies in the 85 children (versus 6% in adults). Also, diagnoses on the basis of 
ratings were the MOre secure diagnostic decisions, because the paired comparison procedure 
less frequently yielded (10%) contradictory results in cases of rating-based diagnoses 
(versus 36 % the other way round). Comparison of the instruction phase, the main phase, 
and the final phase showed that in the final phase the same frequency of diagnoses for 
the distinction between purposeful and inadvertent (58 of 84 children) was obtained, whereas 
the two other diagnoses occurred slightly less often (5 to 6 depending on the standard 
error used). But, still, 42 children distinguished with p < .05 between the negligent and 
the inadvertent fire-setting in their judgments of the final phase. Thus, it appears that 
learning would not account for much of the competency diagnoses. Table 3 presents the 
main advantage gained from the reliability assessment in terms of revealing an age trend 
in the differences among the culpa levels that was not visible in the mean data and also 
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not visible in the arbitrarily chosen numeric difference of one scale unit (lefthand side 
of Table 3) used as a measure of the knowledge of right and wrong as assessed by the 
rating response. 
Table 3: Prcquc:ocica of DiItinc:tion Capecity DiagnoICS of 4 Ace Groups for 3 ADca.mcnt Proccdurea: Numeric 
Compariaon of Individual JudgDICIIP, Psychometrie Dcciaion on the Buia of the Individual Meuurcment 
Error (Dircct), Psychometrie Dcciaion on the Buil of Group Reliability (lndircct). 
NlIJIIerie PI,c1lomdrie 
Dired (p<.10) ladirect (p< .OS) 
CbiIdrea Allulls CbiIdrea Adulls CbiIdrea Adulls 
S-(i7 8-, t S-(i 7 8-, t S-(i 7 8-, t 
PurpolCWOfIC 7 11 2S (43) 24 3 3 10 (16) 11 3 3 9 (15) 14 
negligence 
E1aewisc 18 12 15 (45) 2S 22 20 30 (72) 38 22 20 31 (72) 35 
PurpolCWOfIC 20 17 37 (74) 48 9 15 34 (58) 44 12 1S 31 (58) 45 
inadvertancc 
E1aewisc 5 6 3 (14) 16 8 6 (30) 5 13 8 9 (30) 4 
Negligence WOfIC 20 18 37 (75) 47 6 12 32 (50) 38 8 14 2S (47) 40 
inadvertance 
E1aewisc 5 S 3 (13) 2 19 11 8 (38) 11 17 9 15 (41) 9 
Table 3 shows that the number of individuals who can clearly (p< .10 as weIl as p < .05) 
be diagnosed to distinguish between purpose and inadvertent and between negligent and 
inadvertent fire-setting on psychometrie grounds increased with age independently of 
the method of estirnating the standard error of measurement. In particular, most preschoolers 
cannot be diagnosed as having the necessary capacities of judgment only Ü one of the 
two psychometrie procedures is employed. Moreover Table 3 shows that, in contrast 
to the preschool students, the majority of 7-year-olds can still be diagnosed to have 
distinguished between inadvertent fire-setting and purposeful or negligent fire-setting, 
when psychometrie procedures are applied to the judgments. This age trend drastically 
underlines another empirical part of the validity of the 7-year-age limit in the tort law 
of Germany, that is, the increase in the feasability of the assessments on the individual 
level. 
These psychometrically based results add to those of Schleüer, Shultz, and l.efebre-Pinard 
(1983) who found, only reporting means of 5- and 7-year-olds, an onset of the distinetion 
between inadvertent and voluntary as weil as foreseeable damages but not between voluntary 
and foreseeable. Since the distinetion between purposeful and negligent fire-setting was 
rare in children, in the reported psychometrically based diagnoses the conclusion was 
also substantiated that there may be no clear concept of negligence up to 10 years of 
age. Hook (1989), using a refined broken-cup task from Piaget (1932), claimed so merely 
on the basis of group means. However, employing the present methods allowed a more 
precise statement on an individual level. Finally, these results are in sharp contrast to 
488 Wiifried Hommers 
Tisak and Turiel (1984), who found no developmental trends (6 to 10 years) in several 
interview variables about a prudence incidence describing a child cutting the knee due 
to running too fast and falling down. The difference may be a consequence of several 
methodological dissimilarities in the approaches. But, it may indicate also that moral 
knowledge about negligence with respect toone' s own damage dev610ps earlier than moral 
knowledge about negligence with third-party damages. It is interesting that this was assumed 
byan Upper German Court (OLG Celle 1968, see Hommers, 1983, p. 26) with respect 
to a contributory negligence case in which the victim was a child. However. this cross-study 
conclusion would need direct research. 
Discussion 
To sumrnarize the results on the two aspects for research of legal psychology in the tort 
law competencies: 
Oe lege ferenda in support of the 7-year-age limit was found in the results: (a) two 
"disordinal" age trends in the means of preschool and elementary school students; (b) 
the presence of the apology effect in preschool students; and (c) in accordance with the 
low standard qualification "some understanding", signs of an ongoing development of 
that duty which is not taken to be relevant by the Supreme Court, Le., the decrease of 
the rating differences between apology and no apology with age as well as the increasing 
distinction between the levels of apology and of helping with repair and between the levels 
of third-party compensation and of apology; and (d) the increase in the reliability of indi-
vidual effect sizes from preschool to elementary school age. 
Oe lege lata was relevant in the results (a) that the standard error estirnates were sufficient 
for individual diagnoses from the age of seven years on; (b) that the psychometrically 
based distinction between the two or three culpa levels increased within elementary school 
age but was only rarely present in preschool students; (c) that the implicit Supreme Court 
theory on the indicativeness of knowledge of right and wrong for understanding the duty 
to make recompense was valid; and (d) that the diagnosis of competencies on the basis 
of indirect or direct reliability estimates was independent of intelligence measures and 
of learning within the task. 
As a general consequence for forensic psychology, criticisms like those of Bresser 
(1988) against a trend in forensic or legal psychology that uses psychometrical , statistical, 
and mathematical-experimental methods seems unqualified. Apparently, such legal 
psychology can provide tools and results that are c1early useful for any scientifically defined 
de lege ferenda or de lege lata interface of psychology and law (see Steller, 1989, for 
another reply to Bresser's biographical position). Thus, even today, one should follow 
Marbe's (1913) example of introducing experimental and statistical procedures to the 
civil law expertise work of psychologists. 
In contrast, the previous simplification strategy of basing expertise judgments on IQ 
measures alone (Bresser, 1972; EIl, 1983) is highly questionable. Conceptually, it misses 
the standards set by the Supreme Court. These are twofold: intellectual (use of adequate 
IQ subtests) and emotional-evaluative (use of the moral judgment task employed here). 
Empirically, it is in contrast to the zero correlations between the measures of the two 
standards. However, it is true that forensic expertise needs more complex (multi-method) 
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integrational diagnostic reasoning than that involved in any one single diagnostic tool, 
as has been outlined by Wegen er and SteIler (1986) and SteIler (1988). In support of 
their well-taken broad approach to forensic expertise judgments, it appears recommendable 
to extend the psychometrical research approach as employed here for a first time in a 
meaningful manner to other forensie fields in the interface between law and psychology. 
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